**2020年江苏省研究生“经典与智慧”学术创新论坛**

**征文格式要求**

1. 首页：题目、作者简介（包括姓名、学校、专业、年级）、联系方式（电话和电子邮箱）、中英文摘要、关键词。

2. 论文题目一般不超过20字，必要时可加副标题。

3. 摘要应能反映论文的主要内容信息，具有独立性和自含性，字数一般以200字左右为宜。

4. 关键词一般3-5个。

5. 论文正文（不包含作者个人信息）用小四号宋体字，1.5 倍行距，简体字，字数原则上不少于6000字。

6. 正确区分注释和参考文献。注释是对正文中某一特定内容做进一步解释或补充说明，在正文中对应处以插入脚注形式标注；参考文献是作者写作论文时所参考或引用的文献，按其在正文中出现的先后次序列在正文之后，并在正文对应处右上角用阿拉伯数字标注“[序号]”（上标形式）。

7. 论文采用 word格式，文件命名为：“学校+第一作者姓名+标题”。

**范例：**

**指示性概念与再识别条件**

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**摘要:**在知觉体验内容是概念性的还是非概念性的这场争论中,概念论者通常用指示性概念策略来回应非概念论者提出的基于知觉体验的精细性论证的反驳。一些哲学家质疑这一策略,认为指示性概念并非一个真正的概念,他们的一个重要理由是指示性概念不能满足再识别条件。一些哲学家通过否认指示性概念必须满足再识别条件来保卫指示性概念策略。文章试图表明,否认指示性概念应当满足历时可辨识条件,虽然可以逃脱非概念论者的反驳,但会损害概念论最初的目标,即解释知觉体验为何具有认识上的辩护作用。

**关键词**：概念论; 非概念论; 知觉精细性; 指示性概念; 再识别条件

20世纪七八十年代以后,知觉的感觉予料(sense data)理论逐渐式微,许多哲学家开始倾向于同意知觉意向论(intentional theory)的主张[1]。意向论认为,知觉体验如同信念、愿望这样的心[…]

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# Demonstrative Concept and Re-Identification

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**Abstract：**In the debate over whether the content of perceptual experience is conceptual or non-conceptual, conceptualism proposes the strategy of demonstrative concepts in response to refute the fine-grained argument that are advanced by non-conceptualism. Some philosophers doubted the strategy, they thought that demonstrative concepts is not a real concept. One of the most important reason is their demonstrative concepts cannot satisfy the re-identification condition. Other philosophers defend the demonstrative concepts strategy by denying that reason. According to the two dimensions of discrimination ability or recognition ability, synchronic or diachronic, this paper distinguishes four cases of re-identification condition, and clarifies that the focus of debate among these philosophers is whether the indicative concepts should satisfy the diachronic identification condition. This paper attempts to show that the demonstrative concepts without the diachronic identifiable condition can avoid the rebuttal of the non-conceptualism. But it goes against the original goal of conceptualism, that is, to explain why perceptual experience serves as a cognitive justification.

**Keywords：**conceptualism; non-conceptualism; the fine-grained of perception; demonstrative concepts; re-identification